INTRODUCTION
Many earthquake planning scenarios have been prepared for California and elsewhere. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the California Geological Survey have produced planning scenarios for several large California earthquakes (e.g., Algermissen et al. 1972 and 1973 , Steinbrugge et al. 1987 , Toppozada et al. 1988 . The Earthquake Engineering Research Institute supported earthquake planning scenarios for the New Madrid Seismic Zone, the Hayward Fault, the Seattle Fault, and the northern San Andreas and developed guidelines on creating such scenarios (Preuss and Godfrey 2006) . The present effort, like previous ones, aims to inform preparedness planning. It examines a M7.8 earthquake on the southern San Andreas Fault. It is novel in several ways.
First, like some other studies, physical impacts were estimated using software such as HAZUS V R MH , but unlike prior work, model estimates were in parts supplemented or replaced by 18 focus studies, panel discussions, or a combination. Panel participants included approximately 100 operators, engineers, and other experts from the public utilities and lifeline agencies whose damages are estimated, thus engaging the people most familiar with and responsible for lifeline risk, preparedness, and mitigation. They probably took the scenario more seriously having developed it themselves than had outsiders done it. Second, the scenario was coupled with emergency response and recovery exercises, seminars, and an extensive outreach effort that involved 5.5 million people-nearly 1 in 7 Californians.
Third, the scenario employs cutting-edge research. Ground-motion estimates were developed from physics-based modeling, i.e., by calculating wave propagation from the rupture through the earth's crust to a grid of points on the earth's surface, rather than through seismic attenuation relationships (although results were compared with attenuation results). Fourth, the scenario goes beyond describing outcomes: in almost every topic, it notes research needs and more importantly offers two or three practical measures to prepare for or physically mitigate the negative impacts of the scenario earthquake. Finally, the authors of many sections and special studies are the world's leading figures in the field under consideration, as opposed to competent people applying principles developed by others.
In total, more than 300 practitioners, academics, and government technical experts from more than 50 organizations prepared the most extensive earthquake planning scenario ever created for California. It was led by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), California Geological Survey, and others among the present authors. It was desired that the scenario event occur in Southern California; be scientifically realistic and consistent with current knowledge; be large enough and close enough to population centers to have regional, long-term consequences worth planning for; be likely enough not to be dismissed as a rare or extreme event; and that it comprise a single, specific outcome, as opposed to a probabilistic range. That is, it represents one rupture and one outcome in terms of shaking intensity and ground failure, building damage, casualties, and other consequences. This overview summarizes the work of those 300 experts, whose names are listed in an appendix. The reader is referred to Jones et al. (2008) for the full ShakeOut Scenario, and other supporting studies cited later, for more detail. Note that since the scenario is documented in an open file report whose contents are subject to change, this manuscript summarizes the scenario as of initial publication. Note also that the ShakeOut Scenario was used as the basis for California's official Golden Guardian statewide emergency response exercise and the broader Great Southern California ShakeOut public exercise on 13 November 2008. The exercise writers modified and expanded on the ShakeOut Scenario, so details of the exercises may differ from those presented here.
SETTING
Southern California is home to 6 million households of 20 million people. One in 14 Americans live within the reach of the great earthquake examined here. It has struck before and will again, with perhaps a 1 in 6 chance in the next 30 years. The setting embraces eight Southern California counties: Imperial, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Ventura. They contain 725,000 businesses with 8 million employees earning $360 billion in annual payroll (excluding benefits; http://www.calmis.ca.gov/file/ es202/cew-select.htm). About half are in Los Angeles County.
EARTH SCIENCE ASPECTS
The scenario begins with a M w 7.8 event on a 300-km segment of the Southern San Andreas Fault, beginning at the Salton Sea in southern Riverside County (right edge of Figure 1 ) and rupturing north across San Bernardino County to Lake Hughes (left side of Figure 1 ) in Los Angeles County near Interstate 5 . The Southern San Andreas is known to have generated earthquakes of approximately this size on average every 150 years (e.g., Weldon et al. 1995) . The mean probability of an M w 7.75 or greater earthquake on the southern San Andreas within the next 30 years is 16% (min. 8%, max. 34%), based on the latest seismic hazard assessment (Field et al. 2008) . The fault segment where the rupture initiates (from Bombay Beach to the San Gorgonio Pass) last ruptured in 1680, the middle segment (around the San Gorgonio Pass) in 1812, and the northernmost segment was part of the 1857 Ft. Tejon earthquake (e.g., Weldon et al. 1995 or Field et al. 2008 . Details of the rupture source, such as slip variation (shown in Figure 1 ) and rupture speed variation, were defined based on empirical relations and earthquake source physics using the recent work of the 2nd Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF 2, Hudnut et al. 2008 ). Average slip is approximately 6 m, and reaches 13 m at its greatest. Rupture speed is high (sustained supershear) between Bombay Beach and San Gorgonio Pass in the ShakeOut, generating especially large ground motions in the Los Angeles area ).
Four independent finite-element models were created to model the propagation of seismic energy from the rupture surface through the earth's crust and up to the earth's surface, resulting in three-component ground-motion time histories throughout the affected region. Measures of shaking in various forms were extracted from these models: peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), and 5%-damped spectral acceleration response (S a ) at several periods, and generally agreed ( Figure 2 ). As recently as several years ago, such a level of agreement between the main simulation groups had not been attained. In part, the success in achieving agreement in this case resulted from all groups using an identical source kinematic rupture description, whereas in the past different groups had each employed their own source models. Three of the four groups used the same velocity structure, whereas the fourth group used a newer one with higher resolution. Despite concerns that results might diverge because of this strong difference, even this fourth simulation showed strong similarities to the other three, which lent considerable strength and confidence to the results, especially for ground motions with periods longer than 2 to 3 seconds (which of course strongly affect taller structures).
The URS model ) was used for the final maps of shaking (e.g., Figure 3 ). Such physics-based modeling of ground motion contrasts with the use of empirical attenuation relationships. Though attenuation relationships are probabilistically accurate on average-and generally agree with the physics-based modeling employed by the periods. Maps were also created of PGA, PGV, Modified Mercalli Intensity, liquefaction, and landsliding. Three-component accelerograms were also used in some subsequent analyses ). scenario-they tend to ignore directionality in the fault rupture and details of path by which the ground motion propagates from the fault to various points on the earth's surface. Directionality matters here; even the latest attenuation relationships would fail to capture the strong, long-period motion affecting downtown Los Angeles (e.g., Figure 3 ). Also importantly, even those attenuation relationships that attempt to account for basin effects did not generate median motions in the basins as large as did all of the physics-based models.
Ground motions for the scenario were combined with newly developed susceptibility maps compiled from digital geologic sources to produce maps that show the regional likelihood of liquefaction and landslide effects produced by the event . A more detailed, deterministic evaluation of landslide and liquefaction effects was also conducted within several mountain passes where numerous lifelines (highways, pipelines, etc.) are concentrated ). Ground failure due to liquefaction and landslides has significant impact on lifelines in these regions. Regionally, between 10,000 and 100,000 landslides, the vast majority of which will be shallow-seated rock falls and soil slides, are anticipated. Most will occur on steep slopes within the Transverse Ranges, primarily in the eastern San Gabriel Mountains. Because ground-water levels are typically deep in the interior of Southern California, significant liquefaction is only anticipated north of the Salton Sea, but localized liquefaction adjacent to perennial stream and river channels, such as in the upper Santa Ana and Santa Clara river basins, is realistic.
PHYSICAL DAMAGES, DEATHS, AND NONFATAL INJURIES HAZUS
V R MH ANALYSIS AND SPECIAL STUDIES FEMA's HAZUS V R MH software, supplemented with local data, was used to characterize overall damage to the building stock, and some lifeline damage (Seligson 2008) . Eighteen additional studies were performed to examine physical damage to various aspects of the built environment in more detail. Each was performed by a small research team, an expert panel, or both. These included 10 lifeline studies: telecommunications, highways, ports, wastewater and debris disposal, surface streets, oil and gas pipelines, rail, mass transit, water supply, dams, electric power, and hospitals. Four building types were examined in detail (unreinforced masonry, older concrete buildings, high-rise steel-frame construction, and wood-frame buildings). Finally, special studies were performed to consider elevators, hazardous material release, critical facilities in Palm Springs (a particularly strongly shaken community), and most notably, fire following earthquake.
HAZUS
V R MH ANALYSIS HAZUS V R MH is FEMA's loss-estimation tool for emergency planning. Developed in the 1990s and early 2000s for FEMA by the National Institute of Building Sciences and a large number of technical experts in a wide variety of disciplines, HAZUS V R MH produces societallevel estimates of human and economic consequences of earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. To understand how the HAZUS V R MH earthquake module works in general, see , Whitman (1997) or NIBS and FEMA (2003) . The accuracy of a HAZUS V R MH analysis can potentially be increased by augmenting its default
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inventory databases and by replacing the outputs of its built-in hazard model with externally derived maps of shaking and ground failure. Both enhancements were undertaken.
First, maps of shaking intensity developed for the project were substituted for the maps that HAZUS V R MH produces. HAZUS V R MH considers four parameters: PGA, PGV, S a (0.3 sec), and S a (1.0 sec). The team generated maps of these at the census-tract level, which were weighted to account for the building-inventory distribution at the census-block level, and adjusted to account for shaking amplification produced by soil near the ground surface. Liquefaction and landslide probability maps were also imported to HAZUS
, but the loss estimates were judged to be unreliable and were not used in the final loss totals. Although locally significant, ground failure is not deemed to significantly add to the regional loss.
Second, the default inventory data and models within HAZUS V R MH were enhanced to reflect 2008 replacement costs and incorporate a detailed database of buildings in Los Angeles County derived from tax assessor's data, and calibrated in all counties to reflect available information on unreinforced masonry buildings tabulated by the California Seismic Safety Commission. (Similar tax assessor data for other Southern California counties could not be acquired in time for this scenario.) The inventory model was also enhanced by revisiting the construction type mapping schemes to reflect building density concentrations in urban core areas and construction pattern changes over time throughout the eight counties. Southern California structural engineering experts provided the local judgment to revisit these mapping schemes. With these enhancements, HAZUS V R MH generated estimates of damage and economic loss. Results are discussed later.
SCOPE OF WORK FOR SPECIAL STUDIES
As noted earlier, special studies were undertaken to supplement or replace HAZUS V R MH analysis. In general, each special study was charged with the following tasks:
1. Acquire from scenario leaders the GIS data and imagery of the regional study area, including maps of scenario ground shaking intensity, fault offset along the rupture, and landsliding and liquefaction. The study area includes the eight counties mentioned earlier. 2. Acquire from scenario leaders or elsewhere any relevant data about the locations and features of the aspect of the built environment to be studied. We provided researchers with the locations and relevant, available features of high-rise buildings, the routing of oil and gas pipelines, fiber optic lines, etc. In many cases, authors were selected who already had relevant information about the assets they were examining. 3. Summarize the findings of one or two key studies or past reconnaissance efforts that addressed the physical and operational impacts of earthquakes on the facility type of interest. 4. To the extent practical, characterize the extent, age, structural characteristics, or other relevant features of the facility type of interest in the strongly shaken area.
5. Summarize how vulnerable are the facilities of interest to earthquake effects, i.e., to what extent are they damaged or become inoperative as a function of seismic excitation? 6. Without attempting a probabilistic risk analysis, depict a realistic scenario of damage to the facilities of interest in the study area. What form would the damage take? To the extent practical, describe roughly how long it would take to restore their functionality. Note that authors and panels were repeatedly instructed to depict a single, realistic scenario, neither best nor worst case, but with no particular probability associated with the outcome. 7. What impact does the failure of other lifelines examined during the scenario effort have on the damage or restoration to the facility type of interest? (For example, electric power and water were examined early in the study; these results were offered whenever relevant.) If the special study was of a lifeline (e.g., oil and gas pipelines), what impact might damage to the lifeline of interest have on the damage or restoration to other lifelines? 8. Suggest one or two key mitigation efforts that would be most highly cost effective in reducing the negative effects of the scenario earthquake in terms of repair cost, life safety, or restoration time (dollars, deaths, and downtime), on the facility type of interest. Emphasize immediate, low-cost opportunities and the possible use of earthquake early warning.
In some cases the special study authors used computer models to generate their scenario outcomes. For example, highway bridge damage and highway transportation delays were modeled first using REDARS-2 (http://mceer.buffalo.edu/research/redars/). However, the authors and panels always applied their experience and engineering judgment to arrive at a final result. In the case of panel studies (power, water, dams, roads, mass transit, wastewater, and debris), all eight tasks were undertaken in a single four-hour panel discussion. The discussion began with items 1-3 addressed in 60-90 minutes of presentations by ShakeOut leaders. The rest of the time was dedicated to answering questions 4-8 through structured discussion. Notes were taken that were used to write the scenario text. In the case of research studies, research teams were generally asked to spend no more than 24 labor hours on the task, and provide a brief written report.
The reason for such brief panel discussions and limited research studies is twofold: First, since the work was undertaken for an emergency planning scenario, this was an appropriate degree of effort; it was not necessary to develop probabilistic outcomes with more engineering accuracy. Second, the resources available to carry out these studies were limited. For the most part, panelists were uncompensated, and for the special studies by research teams, only $30,000 in total was available.
With this background on the scope and general charge to damage studies in mind, we turn to some of the study outcomes. Space does not permit providing details of all these studies, but a brief summary of a few such studies may be of interest. Complete summaries can be found in Jones et al. (2008) . Several of the studies are permanently available online; see http://urbanearth.gps.caltech.edu/scenario08/, http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/shakeout.html or search for the term "Shakeout Supplemental Study" at www.google.com/books.
SPECIAL STUDIES HIGH-RISE BUILDINGS
First, note that steel-frame buildings are posited to perform much better than unreinforced masonry buildings, older concrete buildings, and some other types. The high-rise study is summarized here primarily because readers may be interested in the sophisticated modeling employed. A study by researchers at the California Institute of Technology replaced the HAZUS V R MH loss estimates for these buildings. The Caltech researchers created 3-D nonlinear finite element models of three high-rise steel-frame buildings (Figure 4) : an 18-story, roughly rectangular building designed to meet the 1982 UBC; the same building designed to meet the 1997 UBC; and a 19-story, L-shaped building designed to meet the 1997 UBC. All three were analyzed using FRAME3D (Krishnan 2003) , a finite element analysis program created at Caltech that treats material and geometric (P-delta) nonlinearities. The models were subjected to the three-component waveforms described above, at each of 784 points on an approximately 2 km grid.
Each building was analyzed at each point, in two orientations, with and without brittle (pre-Northridge) moment-frame connections, for a total of 9,408 nonlinear dynamic analyses.
Maps were created showing peak transient interstory drift (PTD) at each gridpoint and each model. Figure 5 shows the drift value averaged over the three buildings, two orientations, and two connection susceptibilities. In the figure, yellow means PTD of 2.5-5.0%, red refers to 5.0-7.5%, and dark pink to drift in excess of 7.5%. Consistent with FEMA 356 (ASCE 2000), drift in excess of 5% is deemed likely to result in red tagging, and drift in excess of 7.5% is associated with collapse. The existing stock of steel-frame buildings in the study area was identified in part using the Emporis database (2007); Emporis is one of the world's leading providers of building-related information. Considering the locations of Figure 4 . Steeframe buildings modeled by Krishnan and Muto (2008) .
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these buildings, the Caltech authors considered 8 collapses to be realistic for a planning scenario. A panel of structural engineers who were involved in the SAC Steel Project (1997, for example) reviewed the Caltech study and performed some simple calculations for comparison purposes. They deemed it realistic that at least one high-rise steel building would collapse. For planning purposes, the scenario therefore posits five collapses in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Orange counties; four of which are shown in Figure 5 . In each location, there are pre-1994 high-rise buildings within 500 m of the selected site.
FIRE FOLLOWING EARTHQUAKE
Scawthorn (2008) has developed a stochastic computer model of fire ignition, discovery, reporting, response, and suppression (Scawthorn et al. 2005 ). He applied it to the available scenario data, assuming breezy conditions (10 mph) and relatively low humidity, and considering the effects of enhancements to firefighting capability such as recent efforts to strengthen fire stations and ongoing efforts to develop Community Emergency Response Teams. It is estimated that 200 million square feet of buildings are destroyed by fire, equivalent to 133,000 single-family dwellings. See Figure 6 for a sense of scale. Perhaps 70% of ignitions occur in residences. The economic result is $65 billion in property damage plus $22 billion in business interruption (described later) for a total of $87 billion. This is the scenario's largest single cause of loss.
The catastrophic fire losses occur largely because the number of fires-1,600 ignitions requiring fire department response, of which 1,200 require more than one engine to Figure 5 . Locations of four out of the five hypothetical steel-frame building collapses. Color overlay from Krishnan and Muto (2008) . suppress-exceeds the region's total firefighting capability, at a time when the water supply system is severely impaired by pipeline damage and the loss of electric power, and when the 911 system is impacted by an overwhelmed telecommunications system. The problem would be greatly exacerbated in the presence of Santa Ana winds (strong, dry offshore winds that characteristically sweep through in Southern California in the late fall into winter.) estimates 900 deaths would result from the fires, while Scawthorn estimates 1,000, roughly the same number of fire-related deaths as in the 1995 Kobe earthquake. The smaller figure is used here. A review panel of several of the region's leading firefighters examined the study and uniformly found it to be "A good practical [estimate]… Pretty close to being on the mark… Reasonable… A higher number is possible" (Parker et al. 2008) .
Opportunities exist to mitigate these losses: address challenges of reporting ignitions (e.g., establish a system for text messaging to 911 and develop unmanned aerial vehicles for fire department reconnaissance); enhance water services such as alternative water supply systems and create a hardened, highly reliable "backbone" pipeline system; and enhance energy systems such as wider use of gas shutoff valves and careful review of petroleum refineries, tank farms, and related facilities near Long Beach, which are of particular concern.
OTHER IMPACTS
Other notable aspects of scenario physical damages and injury consequences include:
• 1,800 deaths (including 900 resulting from fire) and 53,000 injuries requiring emergency room treatment. For a sense of scale, Hurricane Katrina killed in excess of 1,300 people (NIST 2006) . The eight counties in the strongly shaken area are home to 20 million people, which means that approximately 1 in 10,000 residents is killed and 1 in 400 is injured to the extent of needing emergency room care ).
• Hospital damage results in losing two thirds of hospital beds in some counties (Pickett 2008 ).
• Total economic loss of more than 45,000 buildings (1% of the region's total) from shaking-related effects, with 260,000 more (1 in 19 buildings) requiring repairs in excess of 10% of the building's replacement cost (Seligson 2008 ).
• Complete economic loss of more than 900 unreinforced masonry buildings (Hess 2008 ).
• Collapse of 50 older concrete buildings (Taciroglu and Khalili-Tehrani 2008) • Collapse of five high-rise (ten or more stories) steel buildings, resulting in 439 deaths . There are approximately 800 buildings in the area of ten stories or greater.
• Temporary loss of electric power throughout Southern California, lasting hours to days.
• Nearly 300,000 sewer leaks or breaks.
• Loss of water supply in the strongest-shaken areas lasting from a few days to several weeks, partly because of 350,000 water pipeline leaks and breaks, partly from the loss of electric power to operate pumps, and partly from physical damage to equipment.
• Damage to water supply aqueducts and canals at 32 places where they cross the fault.
• Oil and gas pipelines rupture and explode at fault crossings, hampering repair efforts for other nearby lifelines (Ballantyne 2008 ).
• Widespread damage to highway abutments and bridges taking up to seven months to repair and damage to two major interstates (I-15 and I-10) where they cross the fault or are disrupted by landslides or liquefaction.
• Damage to three dams serious enough to warrant emergency evacuations.
• Three train derailments, 10-20 rail breaks at fault crossings, and loss of freight rail service for up to two weeks, followed by periodic rail damage due to afterslip (Byers 2008 ).
• Perhaps hundreds of people trapped in elevators for several hours or more (Schiff 2008 ).
• Four hazardous material releases (one ammonia and three chlorine gas releases) affecting 315,000 people in Los Angeles, San Bernardino, and Riverside counties (Eguchi and Ghosh 2008) .
• Widespread impairment of telecommunications, largely because call volume overwhelms service capacity, and from damage to fiber optic lines and other equipment (Tang 2008 ).
• Practical preparedness and mitigation measures are recommended for many of the damages discussed here. The reader is referred to Jones et al. (2008) for detail.
ECONOMIC LOSSES
An economic analysis was performed using an input-output (I-O) model to estimate much of the direct and all the quantified indirect business interruption losses across 20 economic sectors from major sources of disruption. Wein and Rose (2008) detail their analysis of the economic impacts of shaking and fire damage to buildings; damage to water, power, gas, and highway network systems; and the limiting effect of railway network damage on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. For each source of disruption, the I-O analysis required specifying loss of building function, lifeline service outages and transportation capacity losses over time and space. The analysis recognizes economic resilience such that a portion of lost productivity is recaptured appropriately for each sector. The eight-county regional economic loss totals $191 billion, or about twice the $70 to $130 billion loss estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (2005) for Hurricane Katrina. The figure reflects enhancements or replacements to the HAZUS V R MH loss estimates, with analyses of high-rise steel-frame buildings and traffic delays. As illustrated in Figure 7 , these comprise:
• Shaking-induced building damage ($35 billion) and damaged contents and business inventories ($11 billion). For reference, the building inventory in the 8 affected counties has a replacement cost of approximately $2 trillion.
• Fire damage to buildings ($40 billion) and contents ($25 billion).
• Lifeline repairs ($2 billion).
• Business interruption ($68 billion), largely from impaired water supply ($24 billion) and fire following earthquake ($22 billion). This corresponds to 4% of the annual gross regional output.
• Relocation costs ($6 billion), traffic delays ($4 billion), and other lesser costs.
The scenario does not examine that portion of losses that were commercially insured or the increase in repair costs that has been historically observed to occur after catastrophes such as Hurricane Andrew or the 1994 Northridge earthquake, sometimes called demand surge.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Two of us characterized the emergency response and communication activities that take place at 6 different time periods after the earthquake in each of 17 response functions, which can be generally categorized in 8 groups: crisis information (by news media, scientific organizations, emergency response organizations, etc.); search and rescue; victim services (shelter, food and water, etc.); traffic and law enforcement; emergency operations centers; fire suppression; emergency medical services; and lifeline restoration. For each response function, we describe in a matrix the activities in the minutes after the earthquake; 30 minutes later; 2 hours after the earthquake; and 1, 3, and 7 days after the earthquake. Table 1 presents as an example the emergency-response matrix for firefighting. The table is novel; it is the first time emergency response activities have been depicted in this way. The complete table also includes public policy reactions, again a first. 
EXAMPLE USES OF THE SCENARIO
The scenario was used as the basis of the 2008 Great Southern California ShakeOut, the largest ever earthquake response and recovery exercise, involving 5.5 million people, held in conjunction the largest-ever Golden Guardian exercise led by the State of California, which involved 5,340 professional responders. It was used by lifeline agencies, governments, emergency responders, school districts, and others to prepare for or promote emergency planning and risk mitigation. A few examples follow.
The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) used the ShakeOut to initiate a seismic inventory of its 13,800 schools using a smartphone-enabled version of FEMA 154 (Applied Technology Council 1988 , 2002 , a method for rapid visual screening of buildings for potential seismic risk. The system is called Rapid Observation of Vulnerability and Estimation of Risk (ROVER). LAUSD plans to use the data collected with ROVER to estimate building damage in the event of earthquakes using USGS's ShakeCast system, then to perform post-earthquake safety evaluation using a component of ROVER that implements the ATC-20 method (Applied Technology Council 2006) on the same smartphones.
In the Bank of America, more than 20,000 bank associates participated in readiness exercises. The bank piloted its Emergency Notification and Associate Communication Tool to quickly assemble leaders, and tested the Core-to-Mission database, a single repository listing details of critical service-delivery resources. Other bank activities included: an Earthquake Emergency Preparedness Exposition for 3,200 associates at its Brea call center; six preparedness seminars with guest speakers from the USGS and California Institute of Technology; a drop, cover, and hold drill in eight call and data centers and a dozen offices; internal communications drills; dissemination of educational materials to its associates in retail branches; and the use of response playbooks, which set standards for rapid assembly, escalation and response decisions, and external engagement.
The California Governor's Office of Emergency Services ran its first-ever exercise for infrastructure recovery and debris removal. Earlier, more extensive plans were scaled back largely because of the (real) Southern California wildfires of late fall 2008.
The scenario raised a number of important research questions that warrant investigation. For example, since fire is such a large contributor to losses, and fire loss estimates were based on limited analysis, a more extensive study of fire loss under as-is and mitigated conditions might help to inform and motivate mitigation decisions.
County fire officials read the scenario as a warning to prepare for post-earthquake conflagrations. Several fire agencies are looking into training more members of the community to be first responders, learning such skills as basic first aid and turning off gas lines. Los Angeles County Fire Chief Michael Freeman said the county is also looking into ways to better draw water from other sources during a disaster, such as pools or storm drains that are collecting runoff from broken pipes.
To deal with the potential for widespread pipeline breakage described in the ShakeOut Scenario, the East Valley Water District (EVWD) in San Bernardino County initiated plans to stock more replacement pipe parts in repair sheds near areas with more-brittle pipe, and to store more bottled water for employees, families, and customers. Also, they rallied their suppliers, exercised with the California Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (Cal-WARN; www.calwarn.org), and coordinated with numerous utilities in the region. These activities highlighted for EVWD the importance of developing plans in coordination with fire departments regarding firefighting water supplies, and the importance of having representatives of water districts in the emergency operations centers of the operational area.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A hypothetical M w 7.8 earthquake on the Southern San Andreas Fault was studied by more than 300 leading academics, professionals, and government experts, for purposes of creating a realistic, not-worst-case, earthquake emergency planning scenario. The research team found it to be realistic that such an event kills 1,800 people, seriously injures 53,000, and produces losses of $191 billion (4% of the annual gross regional product), of which the largest contributor is fire following earthquake ($40 billion in building damage, $25 billion in content loss, and $22 billion in business interruption loss). Business interruption other than from fire following earthquake is the second-largest contributor to the total, amounting to $46 billion, of which $24 billion results from impaired water supply.
Despite the size of these losses, they would be much greater were it not for steadily improving buildings codes, widespread mitigation efforts for buildings, and extensive efforts by highway and roadway departments and various utilities to prepare for and reduce the impacts of future earthquakes, a process that was assisted by this scenario. Two of the most useful features of the scenario document for mitigation seem to have been (a) its high level of detail and (b) the way the ShakeOut developers, Southern California Earthquake Center, and other local and state leaders engaged in the scenario's development and dissemination. The examples of LAUSD, the Bank of America, the East Valley Water District, and others show that Californians do not need to be convinced an earthquake can happen; rather they need concrete and detailed statements about its consequences so they know what to do about it.
